|
The Gettier problem is a philosophical question about whether a piece of information that happens to be true but that someone believes for invalid reasons, such as a faulty premise, counts as knowledge. It is named after American philosopher Edmund Gettier, who wrote about the problem in a three-page paper published in 1963, called "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?". The paper refers to the concept of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB), credited to Plato, though Plato argued against this very account of knowledge in the ''Theaetetus'' (210a). In the paper, Gettier proposed two scenarios where the three criteria (justification, truth, and belief) seemed to be met, but where the majority of readers would not have felt that the result was knowledge due to the element of luck involved. The term is sometimes used to cover any one of a category of thought experiments in contemporary epistemology that seem to repudiate a definition of knowledge as justified true belief. The responses to Gettier's paper have been numerous. While some rejected Gettier's examples, many sought to adjust the JTB account of knowledge to lessen the impact of both Gettier's own problems and other problems (collectively titled "Gettier problems") created in their mould. Since 1963, experiments have also been conducted to determine whether the instinctive reactions of those presented with a Gettier problem are uniform or display language or genetic biases. ==History== The question of what the conditions are that must be met for something to really qualify as "knowledge" is as old as philosophy itself, and is a constant theme of Plato's dialogues, notably ''Meno'' (97a–98b). The more specific problem Gettier raises was also raised by Bertrand Russell in ''Human knowledge: Its scope and limits''. In Russell’s stopped clock case, as modified by Israel Scheffler,〔in 'Conditions of Knowledge' (1965). Chicago: Scott, Foresman〕 Alice sees a clock that reads two o’clock. She believes it’s two o’clock, and that is true. However, unknown to Alice, the clock she’s looking at stopped twelve hours ago. So, she has an accidentally true, justified belief. Russell provides an answer of his own to the problem. Edmund Gettier's formulation of the problem was important as it coincided with the rise of the sort of philosophical naturalism promoted by W.V.O. Quine and others, and was used as a justification for a shift towards externalist theories of justification.〔, chapter 1〕 John L. Pollock and Joseph Cruz have stated that the Gettier problem has "fundamentally altered the character of contemporary epistemology" and has become "a central problem of epistemology since it poses a clear barrier to analyzing knowledge". Alvin Plantinga rejects the historical analysis: Despite this, Plantinga ''does'' accept that some philosophers before Gettier have advanced a justified true belief account of knowledge, specifically C.I. Lewis and A.J. Ayer.〔 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Gettier problem」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
|